

Independent Oversight Board of the Lebanon Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction Framework

Policy Brief on Empowering Oversight Bodies in Lebanon

October 2025

Background

Lebanon remains at a dangerous juncture with socioeconomic, political, and financial vulnerabilities intensifying daily. While the technical capacity to manage these existential crises may exist, the political will/decision to do so is absent. The management of the multi-layered crises still lacks any decision on a macro structural level.

Public institutions in Lebanon are fundamental to the efficient delivery of services, the provision of infrastructure, and the regulations' effectiveness but also significantly affect fiscal sustainability and competition in the labor market since the public sector is a substantial recruiter of human resources. Thus, oversight bodies such as the Civil Service Board, Central Inspection, Court of Audit, and Higher Disciplinary Council exist to ensure accountability by monitoring public institutions' work, imposing sanctions when violations occur, maintaining public order, and ensuring that public funds are spent legally. Moreover, oversight bodies' mandates are essential to safeguard and promote transparency, prevent and combat corruption, improve public institutions' efficiency, enhance service delivery, build public trust, strengthen democracy, and improve policy implementation.

A key prerequisite for empowering oversight and regulatory bodies is, first and foremost, political will. Without political involvement, backing, and strategy endorsement, any plan remains defunct. To increase transparency and oversight, improve governance, apply the rule of law and checks and balances, and revamp public institutions, oversight bodies in Lebanon must be equipped with human resources, be financially sustainable, and be endorsed by the political class and the government to effectively fulfill their mandates.

Rampant impunity, corruption, and perennial mismanagement of public funds coupled with the deliberate absence of accountability, transparency, and overcharged public services, administrations, and institutions need to be met with a strong independent judiciary, strong oversight bodies, powerful rallies for reforms by civil society, support and pressure from the international community, and political will. However, with Lebanon's sectarian political system in place, decision-making related to accountability becomes increasingly difficult given that polarization is high among the political elite.

Oversight Bodies & Regulatory Authorities in Lebanon

Introduction

Lebanon's oversight bodies are established to ensure transparency, accountability, and good governance in the public sector by monitoring the use of public funds, work execution, and task fulfillment by public servants.

Effective oversight bodies share key attributes: they synchronize institutional frameworks from a whole-of-government perspective, operate independently with sufficient authority, enjoy high-level political support, and are guided by a comprehensive reform agenda.^{[?][?][?]} Strong coordination among¹the three main oversight bodies can improve their coordination mechanism beyond financial investigations at the levels of work plan synchronization and the level of information exchange.²

Oversight bodies can reinforce accountability within the public integrity system by overseeing the management of public funds, investigating misuse , holding violators of laws and regulations accountable, providing recommendations to public institutions and therefore improving administrative work methods, coordinating joint work between different governmental bodies, effectively handling complaints, and verifying the legality of decisions related to the employment of public servants.³

Regulatory oversight bodies such as the National Anti-Corruption Commission which fights, prevents, and investigates corruption, and the Public Procurement Authority which organizes, supervises, controls, and develops the proceedings, systems, and performance of public procurement in Lebanon, are crucial to establishing regulatory norms that enhance transparency, accountability, and the application of the rule of law.⁴

² Ibid.

³ OECD, *OECD Public Integrity Handbook* (Paris: OECD: 2020): 193-209.

⁴ Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan, "The role of the Lebanon Public Procurement Authority", 2022, <http://www.institutdesfinances.gov.lb/events/the-role-of-the-lebanon-public-procurement-authority/>

Key Impediments to the effective functioning of oversight bodies

The key impediments to the effective functioning of oversight bodies in Lebanon are the lack of political will and corruption. Law 175/2020 defines corruption as “utilization of the authority or the occupation in relation with the public funds in order to obtain undue profits and benefits for oneself or for others, whether in a direct or indirect way”.⁵ Political will may be defined as “the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem.”⁶ “It is also the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives – in this instance, reduced corruption – and to sustain the costs of those actions over time”.⁷

The nature of Lebanon’s political system facilitates the state or elite capture that impedes policy action and implementation of long-term developmental policies that are critically essential today.⁸ Forgoing merit-based employment for politically distributed jobs and imposing unsustainable financial burdens on the state’s budget are some direct consequences of corruption and political interference in public administrations, institutions, and bodies, among other things.⁹

According to the Corruption Perception Index for 2023, Lebanon ranks 149/180 and scores 24/100, emphasizing the urgent need to address the rampant corruption that is pushing the country’s standing to a downward trend for the fourth year in a row.¹⁰

Corruption is a means to safeguard the political system in place and ensure loyalty of sectarian followers. A new social contract is bound to take place to create a political will to combat

⁵ Article 1 from Law 175/2020 related to Combatting Corruption in the Public Sector and the Creation of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, Official Gazette, Number 20, 14 May 2020.

“Anti-corruption Law in the public sector No. 175 of 08/05/2020 and the creation of a National Commission to combat corruption,” ALDIC, <https://www.aldic.net/anti-corruption-law-in-the-public-sector-no-175-of-08052020-and-the-creation-of-a-national-commission-to-combat-corruption/>

⁶ Dino Abazović & Asim Mujkić, “Political Will: a short introduction case study - Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015, <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/12465.pdf>

⁷ Derick W Brinkerhoff, “Unpacking the concept of political will to confront corruption”, *U4 Brief* No.1, (May 2010).

⁸ Ziad Abdel Samad, “Structural challenges and obstacles to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda”, 2030 Monitor, <https://2030monitor.annd.org/data/report/arabic/12.pdf>

Karim Merhej, “Breaking the curse of corruption in Lebanon”, *Chatham House*, 29 June 2021, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/breaking-curser-corruption-lebanon/summary>

⁹ Josiane Fahed-Sreih, “Corruption and New Insights in Lebanon”, IntechOpen, 14 August 2023, <https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/87928>

Alex Ray, “Reforming Lebanon’s Regressive State Institutions”, Badil The Alternative, 10 May 2023, <https://thebadil.com/policy/policy-papers/reforming-lebanons-regressive-state-institutions/>

Bullseye: A case study from Beirut on driving governance reform in times of uncertainty”, *Siren Associates*, June 2021, <https://sirenassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Driving-reform-in-times-of-uncertainty-a-case-study-from-Beirut.pdf>

¹⁰ Lebanon’s corruption perceptions index 2023 results reflect a continuing downward trend, *NNA*, 30 January 2024, <https://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/en/justice-law/673002/lebanon-s-corruption-perceptions-index-2023-result>

corruption. Political leadership and a commitment to fighting corruption at the highest levels are essential for initiating and maintaining reforms until results are achieved.¹¹

The absence of political will to enact necessary reforms crucial to Lebanon's recovery from its multifaceted crises continues to exert costs that are becoming increasingly difficult to reverse in the future. Oversight bodies, in turn, are made weaker given the absence of political will to reform, and the lack of financial and human resources, considering the national financial crisis.

Civil Service Board

The Civil Service Board (CSB) was established under Decree No. 114/59 and is divided into two administrations; the administration of officers, and the administration of preparation and training. Its powers include systematizing public administrations and institutions and determining their organigrams, assigning personnel and ensuring they fulfill the appointment terms, and running examinations to employ staff based on merit and competence. It also prepares and trains personnel for the job and manages staff promotion, remuneration, discipline, transfer, and dismissal. The CSB also simplifies administrative transactions and monitors work execution.¹²

Current State

The CSB is central to public sector human resource management, a critical function given that wages constitute a large portion of government expenditures. However, Lebanon's inflated public sector, marked by a patronage system and sectarian quotas, contributes to national fiscal instability and budget deficits. Today, there are only 7,400 public civil servants in a public sector that has the capacity of 27,000 jobs, and by 2030, only 4,000 public servants are anticipated to be part of the public administration.¹³

In Lebanon, the large portion of government expenditures allocated to personnel costs and social benefits coupled with a premeditated absence of proper human resources allocation, are crowding out capital expenditures which contribute to real productivity and economic growth.¹⁴

¹¹ Roberto Martínez B. Kukutschka , "Building Political Will: Topic Guide", Transparency International, 2014, https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/Topic_Guide-_Political_Will.pdf

¹² Gherbal Initiative & Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, "The Lebanese citizens guide on civil service board", Gherbal Initiative & Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, <https://elgherbal.org/reports/J9Qesxf9b5JHwx4nCRaa>

¹³ "19,600 vacancies in public administration", *Business News*, 29 April 2024, <https://www.businessnews.com.lb/cms/Story/StoryDetails.aspx?ItemID=11276>

¹⁴ "Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan, "Lebanon Citizen Budget", <http://www.institutdesfinances.gov.lb/data/lebanon-citizen-budget/>

Lamia Moubayed, "Why Civil Service Reform is an Inevitable Choice in times of crisis", *Assadissa* 4, no. 13 (2013): 13.

Lebanon's personnel costs as a portion of budget expenditures increased in 2017 from 34% to 60% in 2023, whereas the MENA's public sector salaries represent a mere 32% of total government spending.¹⁵

The government's fiscal mismanagement and followingly the budget deficit that prioritized current expenditures over public investment, led to the current fiscal crisis as it bloated the public sector with politically appointed personnel and expenditures that are linked to corruption.¹⁶ The CSB is directly related to sustainable fiscal management goals as it seeks to avert the bloating of expenditures, safeguard the state's budget, and ensure the efficient use of public funds. Legislative Decree No. 114/1959 article 9 postulates that the CSB can send opinions and suggestions to the CoM regarding the annual budget's appropriations allocated to employees and administrative expenses, therefore allowing the CSB to manage the wage bill by investigating if some jobs are indispensable and if they can be filled by existing public employees rather than hiring new persons.

General Recommendations

- Amend Article 9 of Legislative Decree No. 114/1959 to determine necessary positions required for public administrations. This would enable the CSB to right-size the public sector, reduce the fiscal burden, and address economic inefficiencies such as crowding out and low productivity.
- Manage the wage bill by adhering to Article 9 of Legislative Decree No. 114/1959.
- Hire talented and competent employees to drive change and transformation based on merit and steer clear from political hiring.¹⁷
- Adapt to changing needs while ensuring flexibility and innovation.
- Functional reviews are required to get a census of all public employees and their relative functions to streamline the productivity and functioning of public institutions.¹⁸

¹⁵ Wassim Maktabi, Sami Zoughaib, & Sami Atallah, "Lebanon's 2023 Draft Budget: Aimless expenditure", The Policy Initiative, 15 September 2023,

[https://www.thepolicyinitiative.org/article/details/315/lebanon%E2%80%99s-2023-draft-budget-aimless-expenditure#:~:text=Based%20on%20the%202023%20budget,60%25%20of%20total%20expenditures\).](https://www.thepolicyinitiative.org/article/details/315/lebanon%E2%80%99s-2023-draft-budget-aimless-expenditure#:~:text=Based%20on%20the%202023%20budget,60%25%20of%20total%20expenditures).)

Izzah Akram Malik & Jens Kromann Kristensen, "In MENA, civil service performance matters more than ever", World Bank Blogs, 13 January 2022, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/arabvoices/mena-civil-service-performance-matters-more-ever>

¹⁶ Toufic Gaspard, "BANQUE DU LIBAN: A FORENSIC ANALYSIS", *Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs*, February 2024, https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/Banque-Du-Liban-A-Forensic-Analysis.pdf?utm_source=BenchmarkEmail&utm_campaign=Toufic_Gaspard_-_Analysis&utm_medium=email

¹⁷ Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan, "Lebanon Citizen Budget", <http://www.institutdesfinances.gov.lb/data/lebanon-citizen-budget/>

¹⁸ IMF, "2023 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—PRESS RELEASE; STAFF REPORT; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR LEBANON", *International Monetary Fund*, 29 June 2023, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2023/06/28/Lebanon-2023-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-535372>

Note: The Civil Service Board was not available for an interview.

Central Inspection Board

The Central Inspection Board (CIB) is one of several oversight bodies, and a public reform authority that was established in 1959 during the tenure of President Fouad Chehab whose duties are “overseeing public administrations, institutions, and municipalities through different types of inspection, seeking to improve administrative processes, offering recommendations to administrative authorities voluntarily or upon request, coordinating joint operations between different public administrations, and carrying out studies, investigations and missions assigned to it by authorities”.¹⁹ Legislative Decree No. 115/59 gave the CIB the power to offer advice to administrative authorities voluntarily or on demand, and to guide administrations to improve and rectify their administrative processes. Moreover, the CIB produces studies and carries out investigations assigned by authorities. The CIB coordinates joint operations between numerous public administrations to improve administrative processes.²⁰ The CIB helps enhance administrative processes by coordinating joint operations between administrations.

Specialized inspectors are deployed to detect and investigate violations and identify liabilities and liable parties so that the necessary sanctions are imposed, and offenders are referred to the competent prosecution authorities.

Current State

The challenges faced by the CIB are numerous, but the extreme shortage in human resources is dire and urgent to address. With only 6 inspectors to do inspection activities over the 130,000 public employees, the CIB cannot fulfill its mandate, according to the CIB Head Judge Georges Attieh. Article 22 of the Legislative Decree postulates that the Civil Service Board is mandated to transfer employees to the CIB to address the shortage of human resources. The multiple requests from the Central Inspection Board to the Civil Service Board haven't been returned.

General Remarks & Recommendations from the Central Inspection Board

- Accelerate the implementation of e-governance across all ministries and public institutions. Centralized governance with decentralized service delivery can significantly limit corruption.
- Grant the CIB administrative and financial independence from the Council of Ministers' budget to circumvent bureaucratic delays.
- Political, sectarian, and confessional protections are the main reasons why public bodies often reject reports issued by the CIB. To change this pattern, public administrations and

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

institutions need to move beyond this customary resistance, as inspectors frequently face pressure and refusal when conducting inspections. Reports are often dismissed, and recommended actions are not implemented.²¹

- The reluctance to follow the CIB's reports and recommendations stems from the hierarchical tension where inspectors, as 'employees,' have authority over the 'director general,' who is responsible for implementing and receiving these reports. According to Article 22 of Law 115/59, public bodies must adhere to the CIB's recommendations; failure to do so empowers the Council of Ministers to take appropriate measures.
- Improving and enhancing coordination with the judiciary authority.
- Coordination between oversight bodies needs to be strengthened.

Court of Audit

The Court of Audit (CoA) is an oversight body and the highest financial court in Lebanon. Established in 1959 under Decree No. 9/59, it is mandated to oversee the management of public funds. The Court of Audit exhibits administrative and judicial control of state administrations and institutions, state enterprises, certain municipalities, and state-funded associations. The Court exercises prior control to approve capital spending on certain projects and transactions, and subsequent control to verify the appropriate use of the funds.²² It also decides on the validity and legality of transactions and accounts and penalizes in principle those who violate the laws and regulations.²³

In terms of jurisdiction, the CoA has preliminary administrative control on certain transactions including revenue, expenditures, and settlement transactions to confirm their validity and compliance with the budget, legal provisions, and regulations.²⁴

Its judicial control encompasses subsequent control over accounts and employees who manage public funds.

Current State

The CoA faces challenges due to its administrative linkage to the Prime Minister's office, which can exert direct or indirect influence on the CoA's decisions. This influence can restrict the CoA's independent judgment, as seen when the Council of Ministers appeals prior oversight decisions issued by the CoA on the grounds of national interest.

²¹ The culture of reports refers to the instances when the Central Inspection Board sends its reports to the public bodies it is legally mandated to work with, containing recommendations that the receiving end has to take into account. *Those reports are placed in the drawer.*

²² Nicolas Melki, "Public finances reach Court of Audit", *Executive Magazine*, 5 April 2019, <https://www.executive-magazine.com/economics-policy/public-finances-reach-court-of-audit>

²³ Mohamad Ali Moghabet, "Principles of transparency and accountability regulating the Court of Accounts in Lebanon", *Transparency International*, 2023, <https://schoolofgovernance.net/library/court-of-accounts>

²⁴ Nicolas Melki, "Public finances reach Court of Audit", *Executive Magazine*, 5 April 2019, <https://www.executive-magazine.com/economics-policy/public-finances-reach-court-of-audit>

There is a pressing need to recruit personnel (judges, accountants, inspectors, observers), as today, the CoA is working at less than fifty percent capacity in human resources. The very low number of personnel given the large scope of work that the CoA covers threatens the continuity of the CoA while prospective employees also lack the incentive to work given. Within the pool of existing staff in the CoA, some personnel are being transferred elsewhere, which directly contributes to emptying the CoA of employees and impeding its function.

General Recommendations

- Ensure the CoA receives all required information, data, and documents promptly. Its review process has been disrupted by cases of missing, distorted, or damaged documents.
- Support the CoA with a digitized platform to enable quicker, more complete, and transparent audit procedures.²⁵
- Mandate the public disclosure of all CoA reports and special reports on its website, including the responses from audited bodies.²⁶
- The CoA cannot be administratively linked to a governing entity that the CoA must oversee; the Council of Ministers. The budget of the CoA is under that of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, a way to increase the CoA's independence is to be administratively under an independent functionality.
- The Committee of Coordination among oversight bodies needs to be activated to ensure continuity of discussions and follow-up to recommendations and decisions.

Higher Disciplinary Council

Established under Legislative Decree 152/1983, the Higher Disciplinary Council (HDC) replaced the Public Disciplinary Council and provided the Council with the power to impose penalties and disciplinary sanctions specified in the personnel regulations and regulations for municipal officers and according to the sanction scale of each administration. Its main functions are protecting public administrations from abuses and violations committed by employees and safeguarding the proper functioning of the public bodies.²⁷

The HDC has the potential to significantly limit administrative corruption through the powers granted to it, yet its effectiveness depends on the number of employees that are subject to its authority and on the activation of oversight functions in administrations, public bodies, and municipalities.²⁸

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Mohamad Ali Moghabet, "Principles of transparency and accountability regulating the Court of Accounts in Lebanon", *Transparency International*, 2023, <https://schoolofgovernance.net/library/court-of-accounts>

²⁷ Gherbal Initiative & Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, "The Lebanese Citizens Guide on Higher Disciplinary Council", January 4, 2024 <https://elgherbal.org/reports/doDci2hLBODCJkSwWDgm>

²⁸ Yvette Antoun, "Oversight Bodies in Lebanon", *Ecole Nationale D'Administration*, 2016, <http://www.ena.gov.lb/Files/Samples/course18.pdf>

Current State

The HDC faces numerous challenges including the: 1- Lack of capacity to be proactive; and 2- The relatively low number of files reported (due to political influence) from public bodies to prosecute perpetrators and safeguard the functioning of public bodies. The HDC also faces obstruction to its work as there is no political will to enact the required reforms starting from the human resources, separation of power, existing laws and regulations which would allow the effective functioning of oversight bodies in Lebanon.²⁹

General Recommendations by the Institute of Finance

- Modernize legal frameworks to enhance HDC authority.
- Develop a comprehensive anti-corruption plan and improve inter-agency coordination.
- To develop a comprehensive plan to enhance its capabilities to reduce corruption and increase cooperation and coordination between oversight bodies and the competent judicial body, while improving communication channels.³⁰

Empowering the Public Procurement Authority

Established under Law 244/2021, the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) in Lebanon organizes, supervises, controls, and develops the proceedings, systems, and performance of public procurement in Lebanon. It also coordinates several procuring entities and provides technical support and guidance.³¹

The PPA can propose public policies involving public procurement, advocate principles of transparency, openness, and competition, and terminate procurement processes if inefficiencies arise. This involves regulating the framework agreements specified in this law, consolidating data on public procurement activities at all levels within a centralized database, and making,

²⁹ OTV Lebanon, "Today's interview with Judge Marwan Abboud, Head of the Higher Disciplinary Council", 25 February 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9l_fHet-NI

³⁰ Institute of Finance, "Institutions are yours Episode 5: The Higher Disciplinary Council", Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2vVY_XVWBE&list=PLtdXztvgZk7P4uKxDGdm5dl2eNJehh9Y6&index=23
"The National Anti-Corruption Strategy", OMSAR, 2020, https://www.omsar.gov.lb/Assets/docs/NACS_English_Eversion.pdf

³¹ "The role of the Lebanon Public Procurement Authority", *Institut des finances*, <http://www.institutdesfinances.gov.lb/events/the-role-of-the-lebanon-public-procurement-authority/#:~:text=The%20PPA%20shall%20undertake%20the,of%20technical%20support%20and%20guidance.>

maintaining, and publicly recording exclusion decisions in a publicly accessible exclusion register.³²

Current State

Lebanon now has a national law that governs public procurement, and a huge milestone does not come with challenges. According to the Institute of Finance (IOF), three main challenges have been perceived by the institution in implementing the law; one significant issue is the private sector's mistrust in the legitimacy of opportunities to secure public contracts, making companies hesitant to submit bids. Resistance from municipalities as many municipal leaders have resisted the reform or requested exemptions for their areas. The last challenge is maintaining compliance with the law and working on reducing corruption through enforcement of the law.³³

General Recommendations

- Appoint four members of the Public Procurement Authority. The appointment is done through the Council of Ministers and should be done according to competence, away from vested political interests.³⁴

Empowering the National Anti-Corruption Commission

The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), established by Law 175/2020 has several functions, including auditing the declaration of assets and financial interests, combating, preventing, and detecting corruption, contributing to the implementation of laws related to corruption, studying and investigating cases related to corruption and referring them to competent judicial authorities and bodies, protecting whistleblowers, receiving complaints related to the application of the Right to Access to Information Law 28/2017, and investigating the complaints among other things. The Commission is also entitled to address the root causes of corruption and its costs and lead the efforts to combat and prevent it in light of the existing laws and treaties that Lebanon is a signatory of. The NACC monitors the implementation and investigates violations of anti-corruption laws passed in recent years including the Access to Information Law No. 28/2017, the Illicit Enrichment Law 189/2020, the Whistleblower Protection

³² "Public Procurement Reform in Lebanon: Public Procurement Law 244/2021", *Institut de Finances Basil Fuleihan*, August 2021, <https://lp.gov.lb/backoffice/uploads/files/Presentation%20-%20Public%20Procurement%20Law%20in%20Lebanon%20-%20Aug2021%20-%20English.pdf>

³³ Alex Khoury & Damonique Sonnier, "Lebanon's Mission to Transform Public Procurement", Harvard Kennedy School, June 4, 2024, <https://gplpen.hks.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Lebanons-Mission-to-Transform-Public-Procurement.pdf>

³⁴ "Public Procurement Reform in Lebanon Progress Note for the period May - December 2023", *Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan*, 2024, https://www.institutdesfinances.gov.lb/sites/default/files/2024-06/Progress-report-Lebanon-Public-Procurement-reform-Jan2024_0.pdf

Law No. 83/2018, Hydrocarbon Sector Transparency No. 84/2018, and the Public Procurement Law 244/2021.³⁵

Current State

Today, the NACC faces impediments to its efficient functioning and operationalization including but not limited to the delay in the approval of internal regulations and organizational structure which the Public Procurement Authority also faces, a human resources shortage, lacking sufficient funding from the state's budget, and meeting technical needs.³⁶

General Recommendations

- Ensure the NACC receives adequate financial resources to function efficiently and meet its recruitment needs³⁷.
- Buttress international cooperation with international bodies and other anti-corruption commissions to exchange and share knowledge and receive technical support.
- Enhance cooperation between NACC, public bodies, and the judiciary according to Article 18 of Law 175/2020.
- Enhance communication and cooperation between NACC, regulatory authorities, and oversight bodies.

Conclusion

Strengthening Lebanon's oversight and regulatory bodies is critical for rebuilding public trust and enhancing governance. These entities must be empowered with resources, operational autonomy, and political support to drive meaningful reform and accountability.

The roles and functions of oversight and regulatory bodies are critical in rebuilding and establishing the rule of law, particularly as societies transition from conflict to stability. Oversight and regulatory bodies will play an essential role in accountability, preventing corruption and resource misuse as foreign aid and reconstruction funds are anticipated, creating high risks of misappropriation. When political will is there, the oversight and regulatory bodies, would be the foundation to rebuild trust from citizens and international donors and restore public confidence in institutions and government officials, especially when exhibiting accountability and enforcing the rule of law. Their visible application of checks and balances signals a shift away from past practices of impunity and arbitrary authority, promoting a culture of lawful governance.

³⁵ National Anti-Corruption Commission, "NACC Functions", <https://nacc.gov.lb/public-mission/>

³⁶ Maharat News, "The Challenging Path of Reforms in Lebanon: A fully operational national anti-corruption commission: an imperative amid pervasive corruption in Lebanon", May 2024, <https://maharatfoundation.org/media/2682/a-fully-operational-national-anti-corruption-commission.pdf>

³⁷ Ibid.

When Lebanon's oversight and regulatory bodies promote good governance, commitment to accountability, and the rule of law in supporting long-term development, this will promote a fair environment for businesses, foreign investment, and community relations, creating conditions that help stabilize society. The empowerment of these bodies is not merely a technical adjustment but the foundational step toward a new, accountable Lebanon.